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Chapter 1  Introduction 
This paper attempts to articulate the specificity of the ageing1 problem in the 
context of post 3.112 Japan. By looking into the particular needs and risks of the 
elderly in and after the disaster, it shows that a monolithic image of older people is 
problematic with respect to providing them help, and that more adaptable measures 
should be taken in order to cater to each individual of their group. 
The paper contributes to academic discussion in two ways. First, it adds to 
researches on post 3.11 rehabilitation, because it not only discloses drawbacks of 
practices that are carried out too generally to be suited to older people’s real needs, 
but also substitutes stereotypes of old age with a multi-dimensional image that 
accommodates various senses of being old. Second, it helps refine sociological 
theories on ageing, which tend to focus mostly on the structural and systematic 
aspects, because it sheds light on “the less-expected, unscheduled events” (Marshall 
and Bengtson 2011, 24). 
The research on disaster is revealing, for they “disclose fundamental features of 
society and culture, laying bare crucial relationships and core values in the intensity 
of impact and the stress of recovery and reconstruction” (Oliver-Smith 2002, 26). 
Such impacts are multidimensional, “sweeping across every aspect of human life, 
impacting environmental, social, economic, political, and biological conditions” 
(Oliver-Smith 2002, 23-24). In contrast to the naïve conception of disaster as a 
misfortune that is solely natural, researches reveal that “the root causes of disasters 
lay more in society than in nature” (Oliver-Smith 2002, 27). 
The interrelation between nature and society exhibited in disasters can be most 
significantly demonstrated with the concept of vulnerability. Defined by Blaikie et al. 
as “the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, 																																																								
1 “Ageing” is the British counterpart of the term “aging” in North-American scholarship. In this paper, I stick to 
the former in my own language, while keeping the spellings as they are in quotations. 
2 The 2011 earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku (Tōhoku-chihō Taiheiyō Oki Jishin), also known as the 
2011 East Japan earthquake and tsunami, or the 3.11 Great East Japan earthquake (Higashi nihon daishinsai). 
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cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”, the occurrence of 
a natural hazard is distinguished from the production of a disaster, which results more 
from unsafe conditions already latent within the society (1994). Oliver-Smith notes 
that people “differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or age” are 
placed “at different levels of risk from the same hazard and of suffering from the 
same event” (2002, 28). 
Based on these insights, this paper proposes specifically that the same event, the 
3.11 disaster, is not experienced the same among older and younger people. The 
vulnerability of older people is greater, not only because of physical limitations, but 
more significantly because of the structural inequality they are faced with. 
Accordingly, although this paper situates itself within the context of disaster, it 
focuses not only on individual and collective reactions to the disaster, but also on the 
structural discrimination and deficiency that, when agitated by the occurrence of the 
natural hazard, challenges the elderly in various ways. It helps define specific 
difficulties and needs of the elderly in disasters, and thus reduce potential mortality 
and alleviate other negative consequences concerning the ageing population. In short, 
the studies on disaster can be extended by bringing the specificity of older people into 
focus. 
On the other hand, the sociology of ageing benefits from this study because, as 
opposed to the usual tendency to focus on macroscopic and long-lasting issues, an 
examination on post 3.11 Japanese society reveals more transient and microscopic 
aspects that a large-scale sociology of ageing usually leaves untouched. Compared to 
long-term factors of the life course, which can usually be accounted for with models 
and general theories, the impact of disaster is better studied with context-specific 
observations, for situations usually vary case by case, and it is impossible to devise a 
unitary image that accommodates everyone’s specificity. 
Both of the two ways in which this paper tries to contribute to academic 
discussion call for attention to specificity. This, however, is not an easy task. One 
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cannot expect to recognize immediately the needs of the elderly within a post-disaster 
society. 
The approach taken here is an anthropological one. Instead of regarding senility 
and disaster as technical problems, and thus trying to explain them, “fix” them and 
eventually leap over them, this paper admits that they are ultimately inevitable. It 
acknowledges the facts, comfortable or uncomfortable, by patiently living with them. 
It directly confronts people’s life experiences, feelings, emotions, as well as what 
gives rise to them. The whole paper is written with the belief that one really helps 
only when one properly understands. 
The organization of discussion is inspired by the anthropological method of 
“thick description”. Starting with general and large-scale documentation of the 
situation, prevalent theories and their findings, it then gets deeper and deeper by 
confirming, modifying or challenging them with observations of the life of the elderly 
in post 3.11 Japan. Such observations may come either from reports of researchers or 
from interviews and fieldwork experience. 
The main chapters of this paper are divided according to the level of 
manifestation of the problem of old age. The underlying idea is that, although the 
problems have various sources and causes which are usually interrelated, they tend to 
become explicit and radicalized at a certain level. The body of the paper is 
accordingly divided into four parts: 1) the governmental level (Chapter 3), including 
public policies, legislation, government practices after the disaster etc.; 2) the 
organizational level (Chapter 4), including the function of NPOs and neighborhood 
associations; 3) the family level (Chapter 5), including taking care of the elderly, rules 
of inheritance, patterns of co-residence, domestic rituals etc.; 4) the personal level 
(Chapter 6), including individual perceptions, emotions and feelings as well as the 
ways they are expressed or suppressed. It is important to note here that the 
classification is not made according to the causes of the phenomena. For example, 
some stereotypes of old people are manifested in personal perception, but have roots 
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in social structure, ideology or media discourse; they should fall into the fourth 
category of this paper rather than the first. 
The research tends to focus on the prefecture of Iwate, and the fieldtrips and 
interviews were mostly carried out there. The reasons are that, first, in Fukushima, the 
situation gets complicated by the accompanying nuclear disaster. With areas 
becoming devoid of residents, it is more difficult to evaluate the impacts of the 
disaster on the elderly as well as the corresponding reacts. Second, Miyagi, the 
regional economic center of Tōhoku area, has been less affected by the ageing 
problem, and is thus not as typical as Iwate for an examination on the elderly in and 
after the disaster. 
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Chapter 2  The Context of Research 
The ageing of population is an urgent problem in nowadays society. Holding 
41.9 million citizens over the age of 60, Japan “has the highest proportion of older 
people [those over 60] in the world (32.8%)”, and this proportion is expected to reach 
37.3% in 2030 and 42.5% in 2050. On average, a 60-year-old can expect to live for 
another 26 years, among which 20.3 years are lived in good health (Global Age Watch 
2015). To be more specific, in 2008, when the Medical System for Elderly in the 
Latter Stage of Live (kōkikōreisha iryōseido) was introduced, the average life 
expectancy of Japanese male was 79, and female 86. It is reported by Global Health 
Observatory (a branch of World Health Organization) that, by 2013, the Healthy Life 
Expectancy (HALE) at birth of Japanese was 74.9, ranking the first among WHO 
member states (2015). 
Accordingly, there are “growing concern […] for the problems of the aged”, 
exemplified by “the growth of gerontology and the impressive size and resources of 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Institute on Gerontology”. (Palmore 1975, 111). However, the 
concern remains largely superficial. In a survey concerning knowledge about old age 
among Japanese college students majoring in the study of social welfare, it is shown 
that those questions concerning the physical features of the elderly is better 
understood in comparison to those about mental features. For example, a large 
proportion of respondents (89% among freshmen and 85% among junior students) 
mistakenly believe that the majority of the elderly tend to feel bored, which in fact is 
not true (Minami 2004). 
The lack of depth of understanding calls for systematic studies on old age. 
Ideally, such studies should accommodate the varieties of interpretations and help 
people treat the elderly with respect to their particular situations. 
The sociology of ageing witnessed a boom in the 1960s, which, according to 
Marshall and Bengtson, were “a dazzling period of theoretical developments in the 
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sociology of aging at both the macro and micro levels” (2011, 17-18). During the 
years of 1979-2009, the sociological studies of ageing was rapidly brought to maturity 
and institutionalization. Journals such as Research on Aging, Journal of Aging Studies, 
and Ageing and Society emerged during this period. Scholarship of ageing enjoyed 
more than “a marginal status in most disciplines” and no longer needed to “struggle 
for its legitimacy as an area of inquiry” (Settersten and Angel 2011, 3-4). In terms of 
content, the sociology of ageing evolved from the debate between the “disengagement 
theory” and the “activity theory”3 into a “systematic research on age norms”, then 
followed by manifold investigations concentrated upon “the life course perspective” 
(Marshall and Bengtson. 2011, 18-20). 
Prosperous and prominent may it be, but the sociology of ageing still faces a 
number of challenges nowadays. Notably, “the predominance of the life course 
perspective” may sometimes “obscure our vision, preventing us seeing the value of 
different perspectives”, especially when sociologists are “trying to squeeze theorizing 
into the life course perspective” (Marshall and Bengtson 2011, 28). 
This, of course, does not mean that the life course perspective is inherently 
problematic, misleading, or outdated. In fact, it is undoubtedly relevant to the research 
interest here. Interpreting the problem of ageing as an expression of the 
standardization of a series of stages within one’s life, the perspective reveals that “the 
life course, when defined as interdependent sequences of age-related social roles 
across life domains (family, education, work, health, leisure), is a product of the 
linkages among state (welfare), market and familial (gender) institutions, and 
demographic behaviors across the life span” (Marshall and Bengtson 2011, 23). It can 
thus be inferred that what one encounters as a member of certain age group is 
profoundly related to all those contextual factors and their historical vicissitudes. For 
example, the episodes an 87-year-old Japanese woman in post 3.11 Rikuzentakata 																																																								
3 According to Marshall and Bengtson, the disengagement theory “posited that biological, psychological, and 
social withdrawals were universal, inevitable, and adaptive in preparing both the individual and the society for 
eventual death”, whereas the activity theory “implicitly treated aging as a decrement to be ‘adjusted to’ by 
attempting to maintain as much as possible the activity levels of mid-life”. Both sides “led to healthy progress in 
the explicit development and testing of concepts and theories over the next two decades”. 
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underwent can hardly be studied without reference to the roles her generation played 
when she was young, as well as the way her generation gets perceived and 
accommodated nowadays. 
However, the life course perspective, with its emphasis on constant or long-term 
factors, might distract us from the fact that there are still unexpected impacts on the 
life course. The life courses of individuals, of which ageing is thought to constitute a 
major part, can be dramatically disrupted by disasters. As Shanahan and Porfeli 
observes, “chance events” such as disasters exceed statistical calculation of 
probabilities when perceived in real life (2006). One has to take additional 
precautions against probable disasters, for otherwise one would turn out to be utterly 
helpless whenever they really come. This is exacerbated by the fact that modern 
societies are what Beck calls “risk societies” (1992). In these societies, “social 
institutions provide less ‘insurance’ against the vicissitudes of life, […] and 
individuals are expected to assume responsibility to navigate these risks” (Marshall 
and Bengtson 2011, 24). 
Consequently, vulnerability of the elderly in the face of disasters results partly 
from the fact that modern societies tend to leave them alone under such circumstances, 
whereas traditional societies provide more bonds between generations, so that 
whoever runs into a disaster is less likely to remain helpless. That being said, this 
paper is not so much a challenge to the life course perspective than an amendment to 
it by means of shedding light on 1) how life courses of different people can diversity, 
especially under the impact of the disaster, as well as 2) how different life courses 
result in different situations in disaster. 
Related to the second point, there is a particular vulnerability of the senior group 
in disasters. A report released by Help Age International, an international NGO that 
aims at the well-being of older people, points out four key reasons why older people 
are more vulnerable in the face of disasters (Hartog 2014): 
1. Physical decline that comes with ageing, which can include poor health, mobility, sight 
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and hearing. 
2. Lack of provision of adequate services for older people, both on a daily basis and in 
emergency situations. 
3. Age discrimination, which serves to exclude and isolate older people, and often violates 
their rights. 
4. Poverty levels among older people, often exacerbated by lack of social protection 
mechanisms and livelihood opportunities. 
Specifically, a statistical research on the 3.11 earthquake by Nakahara and 
Ichikawa corroborates the vulnerable features of the elderly by showing that, in 
regions of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, “age-specific mortality showed 
a tendency to increase with age; there were no sex differences” (Table 1). (2013) 
 
Table 1  Number of deaths by region, sex, and age group 
Age 
(years) 
Iwate Northern Miyagi South 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
0-4 33 1.5 16 0.8 47 1.8 46 2.2 41 1.6 52 2.1 
5-14 26 1.2 26 1.4 102 3.9 84 4.0 68 2.6 64 2.6 
15-24 53 2.4 53 2.8 53 2.0 66 3.1 90 3.4 91 3.7 
25-34 78 3.5 87 4.5 111 4.3 102 4.8 105 4.0 130 5.3 
35-44 133 6.0 136 7.1 156 6.0 138 6.5 160 6.1 174 7.2 
45-54 194 8.7 184 9.6 216 8.3 180 8.5 210 8.0 219 9.0 
55-64 369 16.5 337 17.6 389 15.0 333 15.7 436 16.5 451 18.5 
65-74 513 23.0 452 23.6 510 19.7 517 24.4 529 20.0 535 22.0 
75+ 834 37.3 626 32.7 1005 38.8 654 30.8 1000 37.9 717 29.5 
Total 2233 100.0 1917 100.0 2589 100.0 2120 100.0 2639 100.0 2433 100.0 
 
For sure, the fact that the aged are more likely to be killed in disasters has its 
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roots in their physical decline. But it also results partly from inadequacy in 
post-disaster policies and programs, which, in turn, is frequently caused by the lack of 
precise understanding of the target groups: when projects are carried out without 
flexibility, or when stereotypes of the elderly interfere, it usually turns out that what is 
provided for them does not correspond to what they actually need. 
Before going into the details, it is helpful to have a working definition of being 
old. However, as life expectation is prolonged with the development of medical care, 
it becomes harder to find a unitary definition. On the governmental level, according to 
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (kōseirōdōshō, MHLW), people stop 
paying the social insurance at the age of 60 and are eligible to receive public pensions 
(kōtekinenkin) from 65 (MHLW 2017). As for the medical insurance, people aged 
between 65 and 74 are regarded as “early elderly” (zenkikōresha), while those over 75 
“late elderly” (kokikōresha); the long-term care insurance system (kaigohokenseido) 
considers persons between 40 and 64 as secondary insured persons 
(dainigōhihokensha), while those over 65 primary insured persons 
(daiichigōhihokensha) (MHLW 2015). In the Road Traffic Law of Japan, a person 
aged over 70 is encouraged to display the “aged driver sign” (kōreisha mark) on the 
front and rear of the car, while drivers aged 75 and over must apply the mark (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1  The “aged driver sign” 
 
In terms of employment, there is no definite criterion either. 95.4% of Japanese 
corporations have established a retirement system. Table 2 shows the distribution of 
retirement age among these corporations (MHLW 2015). 
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Table 2  Distribution of retirement age among Japanese corporations with retirement systems 
Enterprises with a definite 
age of retirement 
Among them, the age of retirement is set at 
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 or above 
98.2% 80.7% 0.5% 1.0% 1.3% 0.4% 15.2% 1.0% 
 
With respect to people’s self-recognition, a 2014 survey carried out by Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan (naikakufu) on people aged over 60 shows the 
proportion of people who think themselves as kōreisha (Table 3): 
 
Table 3  “Do you think you are a kōreisha?” 
Age range Positive (%) Negative (%) Unanswered (%) 
60-64 10.3 86.4 3.3 
65-69 24.4 71.8 3.8 
70-74 47.3 48.2 4.5 
75-79 66.2 26.4 7.4 
80-84 78.7 12.5 8.8 
Above 85 85.6 6.2 8.2 
 
As is shown in the table, it is not until the age of 75 that more than half of the 
people would regard themselves as kōreisha, which contradicts the common social 
practices of treating persons over 60 or 65 as old. Correspondingly, the Japanese 
Gerontological Society (nihonrōnengakkai) and the Japan Geriatrics Society 
(nihonrōnenigakkai) proposed to re-define the categories of old age as they observed 
the phenomenon of rejuvenation (wakagaeri) in the fact that, compared to a decade 
ago, the ageing process can be delayed for 5-10 years (2017). People between 65 and 
74 are defined as “pre-old” (junkōreisha); people between 75 and 89 are called “old” 
(kōreisha); those above 90 are called “super-old” (chōkōreisha). 
	 11 
In this paper, the categorization of the elderly is achieved by means of adhering 
to the discourse. In other words, it acknowledges the variety of conceptions about old 
age, and regards any material with expressions such as kōresha, otoshiyori and rōjin 
as potentially relevant. The reason for bringing materials with different definitions 
together is that all of them constitute a general image of the elderly – and moreover, 
when an author makes his or her own definition, the definition is intended to 
correspond, in its specific context, with the general image. Items within this set of 
concepts share a relationship of family resemblance. Therefore, the working definition 
of old age is broad enough to accommodate a range of materials, but not so broad that 
it becomes impossible to claim generality. 
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Chapter 3  The Governmental Level 
This and the next chapter analyzes the structural implications within Japanese 
society which gets manifested in the way institutions tackle with the elderly. An 
overview of the situation of senior citizens at the institutional level with regard to 
institutionalized policies, such as pension, health insurance and retirement system of 
older adults is already provided in the previous chapter. Now it is time to pay special 
attention to the adequacy or inadequacy of institutional practices in and after the 3.11 
disaster. 
The examination begins with government policies. The nature of policies is that 
they are made to apply generally, and often in an undifferentiated manner, to every 
target citizen. For example, as is mentioned in Chapter 2, the age limits concerning 
retirement or reception of pension refer mostly to chronological age and “do not take 
into account the actual state of physical or psychological ageing of an individual, 
although the subjective deﬁnition of one’s own ageing is very likely to be heavily 
inﬂuenced by them” (Linhart 2008, 125). Since the life of a Japanese person is mostly 
associated with occupations and earnings, the changes that the policies stipulate are 
likely to be indicative of “a person’s social status” (Linhart 2008, 127). This shows 
that government policies are forceful in formulating supposedly homogeneous groups 
and assigning to them people who may well diversify in their particular ways of 
belonging to those groups. 
Another character of government policies, especially those devised in a hurry, is 
that they tend to construe their target citizens as mostly passive. Instead of believing 
in and waiting for spontaneous changes they may initiate, policies are usually 
manipulative, interfering in all the matters and making decisions for people. For 
example, the pension system is “designed to protect and guarantee, rather than to 
promote autonomy and independence”, for it is “geared toward promoting certainty 
and predictability” (Hashimoto 2000, 20). The welfare of a person is most certain and 
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predictable if he or she remains compliant and follow the ways the policy designs. 
In addition, some of the policies carry implicit discriminations that may lead to 
structural inequality. As a result of many years of national concentration on the 
development of the Greater Tokyo Area, the Tōhoku area, with the exception of 
Mayagi, the regional economic center, has been largely drained of young and capable 
population. Older people from the area are less likely to be benefited by such policies, 
and thus have no choice but to stay. Fig. 2 and 3 illustrate the proportion of the elderly 
in Tohoku disaster-hit area as compared to that of Tokyo and of the whole country. 
 
 
Fig. 2  The proportion of people over 65 by prefecture 
(2010 Population Census, Statistics Bureau Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan) 
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Fig. 3  The outstanding ageing proportion of Tohoku region 
(2015.10.1, Japan Statistics, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, MIC) 
 
These three features of government policies (generality, manipulation and 
implicit discrimination) accounts for the fact that they leave vulnerability and risks in 
the society. Once the society is faced with an unexpected disaster, vulnerability and 
risks turn into manifest problems. When the 3.11 earthquake hit the areas that were 
suffering from ageing problems, the elderly was the first to be exposed to death 
threats. Fig. 4 (next page) shows the causality proportion in the 3.11 disaster by age 
ranges. 
Four main factors contribute to the astonishingly high rate of causality of the 
elderly. First, their ability to move and to avoid danger is limited, which accounts for 
the high probability of immediate death. Second, they usually lack information about 
or understanding of the disaster and their own situation, which led to delay of 
evacuation or utter inactivity. Third, their living and medical conditions were 
drastically deteriorated due to the disaster (Ōtani 2012). Fourth, some of them 
committed suicide due to depression, poor living condition or isolation after the 
disaster. If the first factor can still be ascribed to the physical, the rest three are 
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obviously related to policy-resulted vulnerability of the area: there is not enough 
young people in the area to carry out crucial tasks in and after the disaster, such as 
explaining to the elderly the severity of the disaster, providing medical care, and 
accompanying the elderly through their hardest days. 
 
 
Fig. 4  Causality in the 3.11 disaster (2011.3.11-2013.3.11)4 
(National Police Agency Japan) 
 
Some policies and programs are carried out in and after disasters with good 
intentions, but fail to meet their goals due to ignorance of particular needs of the older 
people in disaster-hit areas. After 3.11 earthquake, the Japanese government carried 
out the three-step system for the accommodation of local residents in the aftermath of 
the disaster: 1) evacuation centers (hinanjo); 2) pre-fabricated temporary housing 
(kasetsujūtaku, Fig. 5); 3) “disaster recovery social housing” (fukkōjūtaku, Fig. 6). Of 
course, people who are affluent and have strong social networks could rebuild their 
own houses and restart their business from zero; it is not rare that wealthier persons 
would choose to leave the hometown, moving to hotels, relatives’ houses, or private 
rental housing (chintaijūtaku). The majority of older people, however, have less 																																																								
4 The causality presented here refers to the amount of payments of condolence money for disaster victims. 
Therefore, it includes those who were injured in the disaster and died because of the injury. 
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choices because they can neither afford to restore their former houses nor to move to 
other cities due to the low income / pension level. 
 
  
Fig. 5  A village of kasetsujūtaku in 
Takekomacho, Rikuzentakata 
(photo taken Apr 2016) 
Fig. 6  A complex of fukkōjūtaku in 
Takekomacho, Rikuzentakata 
(photo taken Apr 2016) 
 
As for the evacuation centers, Ōtani reports issues of “privacy, hygiene and 
nutrition”: 
Many survivors are located in large facilities with little privacy, with families divided 
by cardboard boxes in crowded school gyms. Emergency toilets are often built outside the 
buildings in open-air places. […] In the cold weather many people, especially older people, 
restricted their eating and drinking because they did not want to wake up in the middle of 
night to walk to the outdoor toilets. This caused many to suffer from dehydration and 
malnutrition […]. (2012, 244) 
Things did not get less problematic when older people were moved into social 
housing provided by the government. The houses were poorly or even inadequately 
constructed because the government’s sole attention to apparent results. According to 
my interview on 28th Oct 2016 with the chair of the neighborhood association 
(jichikaichō) in a temporary housing complex (kasetsudanchi) in Ogatsuchō, the city 
of Ishinomaki, the public restoration housing there was not damp-proof, so that mold 
was found on the walls of rooms on lower floors. In my fieldtrip to Takekomachō, the 
city of Rikuzentakata, I have observed a decline in the supporting land (jibanchinka) 
of some social apartments. The reason was that they were hurriedly built on piled-up 
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(kasaage) grounds in order to “avoid” the damages of potential tsunamis, but the soil 
used was taken directly from the neighborhood and was not resistant enough to 
humidity (Iwate Nippo 2016). 
As the assignment of families into social houses was based on individual 
households, old communities and social bonds were largely broken. Yotsui et al. states 
that: 
Due to land shortages, only 30 percent of those eligible were housed in 
community-allocated units. The remainder were housed according to a ballot system where 
individual households waited at a shelter until they were relocated to temporary sites using 
a random selection process. With long-standing communities almost completely dismantled, 
older people in some temporary housing communities suffered many physical and mental 
problems due to a decline in social interactions. (2016, 1054) 
The neglect of the function of communal bonds has double effects: not only the 
primary bonds at villages where people originally lived were damaged, but the 
secondary bonds formed at temporary housing places, which were still weak, did not 
have the chance to survive. People who were waiting there for social housing did not 
know when they or their neighbors would be selected by the ballot system and thus 
move out. When they eventually arrived at social houses, they found life there even 
more isolated. This is threatening especially for older people living alone. As Table 4 
shows, this group takes up roughly one fourth of the residents at fukkōjūtaku (Kahoku 
Shimpō 2016): 
Table 4  Older residents of fukkōjūtaku in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima (11th Sep 2016) 
Prefecture 
Number of residents 
(in thousands) 
Proportion of people 
over 65 
Proportion of people 
over 65 living alone 
Iwate 5657 40.8% 27.1% 
Miyagi 21470 37.8% 23.2% 
Fukushima 7470 40.5% 26.4% 
General 34597 38.9% 24.6% 
	 18 
 
In fact, the issue of older people living alone at social houses already acquired 
the attention of the government. Accordingly, the government decided to first move 
those living with their families out of the evacuation center, in the hope that people 
left at the center might keep one another’s accompany. This, however, led to some 
older people’s feeling abandoned by the whole society. 
According to a report by Asahi Shimbun (2016), in temporary housing, the 
problem of dying alone (kodokushi) has become worse and worse since 3.11 in the 
three disaster-hit prefectures (Fig. 7). Among the 190 deaths from 2011 to 2015, 109 
(57.4%) were aged over 65; 137 (72.1%) were male. The reason for this is that, with 
people continuously moving out, the bonds of neighborhood is getting increasingly 
weaker. During the five years, 162 people committed suicide due to 3.11-related 
issues, out of which 106 (65.4%) were above 60 years old; 107 (66.0%) were male; 
and 93 (57.4%) killed themselves for health reasons (MHLW 2015). 
 
 
Fig. 7  The situation of kodokushi in post 3.11 kasetsujūtaku 
 
The government also provided condolence money to the families of those who 
were killed by the disaster. However, the amount was set to be identical and did not 
take into consideration the victim’s role in his or her family. While the amount might 
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be reasonable for a normal family, it was usually insufficient for older people who lost 
their bread-winner spouses or children. Inequality also arose from procedural 
obstacles in applying for other kinds of funding, for they usually required that people 
actively reach to the institutes that issued them and prepare forms and supporting 
materials. This was sometimes difficult for older people who could not see, hear or 
write well, who were not able to get to the agents of institutes due to reduced mobility, 
or who were suffering from psychological problems that prevented them from 
reaching out for help. In addition, there was hardly any regulation or advice on how to 
spend the condolence money. Some older people, especially men under great pressure, 
simply used it for gambling (pachinko) or to live an alcoholic lifestyle, and thus went 
broke soon after receiving the money. 
All these show that, while government policies can be expected to address 
general concerns and accommodate basic needs in and after the disaster, it is still very 
likely that they leave behind structural (that is, more than sporadic) problems with the 
elderly, who usually need to be taken care of on a one-to-one basis. 
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Chapter 3  The Organizational Level 
Non-governmental and local institutions are supposed to work at a more 
down-to-ground level in order to meet the specific needs of the elderly. With respect 
to the social capitals they make available, these institutions can be further 
distinguished into two types: 1) the bridging type, namely institutions that were 
already existent outside the disaster-hit communities and that interfered to offer them 
help; 2) the bonding type, namely institutions that developed, usually in an 
improvised manner, out of the disaster-hit communities themselves. 
The bridging type is best represented by non-profit organizations (NPOs) or 
voluntary organizations. Coulmas notes that “the significance of elderly care by 
voluntary organizations” lies in the fact that they “assume a new role between family 
and state in the production and reproduction of social life” (2007, 71). In other words, 
NPOs function as the mediation between macro and micro levels of elderly care. In 
fact, the Japanese government has already realized the importance of NPOs and the 
indispensable roles they play. The enactment of the Nonprofit Organization (NPO) 
Act in 1998 is a sign that the government supports the work of NPOs and attempts to 
integrate them into a more comprehensive system of elderly care (Adachi 2000, 200). 
Table 5 provides an overview of NPOs related to elderly care in Tōhoku area (Potter 
2008, 693). 
Table 5  NPOs related to elderly care in Tōhoku area 
Prefecture Total NPOs Social welfare NPOs Elder care NPOs Other care facilities 
Aomori 203 na 80 395 
Akita 130 na na 374 
Iwate 249 154 na 353 
Yamagata 197 121 36 249 
Miyagi 412 166 50 534 
Fukushima 328 na 48 380 
Japan total 24727 11519 4067 22180 
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The activities of these NPOs include at-home living support, rest home / day 
service support, cultural and social projects, provision of goods tailored to elderly, and 
so on (Potter 2008, 698). After 3.11, lots of volunteer groups are also involved in 
removing debris, cleaning shelters, assisting agricultural activities, chatting with 
survivors and helping with organizing community-bonding assemblies, such as 
“handcraft café” (shugekafe), “cuisine classroom” (ryōrikyōshitsu) and Karaoke 
singing competitions. (Fig. 8 and 9) 
 
  
Fig. 8  Posters of community-bonding assemblies 
in a fukkōjūtaku complex (taken Jun 2016) 
Fig. 9  A shugekafe at the 
community center (shūkaijo) of a 
kasetsujūtaku (taken Apr 2016) 
 
It can be said generally that NPOs are “answering a public need not fulﬁlled by 
public social welfare policies”, and furthermore, that they also “function as outlets for 
social participation for the elderly” (Potter 2008, 704). However, researchers like 
Ogawa found that the voluntarism associated with NPOs has been promoted by the 
government in a somewhat coercive manner, so as to mobilize young people (mostly 
high school and college students) to “take care of the expanding number of ageing 
people as non-paid workers” (2008, 723). Although this may not significantly 
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influence enthusiasm in helping older people through NPOs, such enthusiasm is 
usually blind, for young people who are involved have little opportunity to properly 
understand what they are doing and why. For example, Slater reports in his 
post-disaster ethnography that an old man living alone said to the volunteers who 
attempted to help him repair his yard which had been destroyed by the earthquake: 
“No help needed here. We’re pretty much OK.” He had no interest in the volunteers or 
their offer, while the volunteers, feeling “unappreciated and unwanted” without 
understanding the old man’s psychological situation, cultural norm or practical needs, 
simply thought that the old man was “creepy” (2013, 271-273). Clearly, the elderly 
can only be taken good care of with enthusiasm and endurance, and more 
indispensably, with professional skills as well as appropriate comprehension. 
Another case is from a local NPO that aims at linking the younger generation 
with regional vitalization Tomiokamachi, a town where the Fukushima Daini Nuclear 
Power Plant was located and where all residents were required to evacuate after 3.11. 
When I asked the director how they helped the elderly in their voluntary activities, he 
replied that the problems of the elderly are very “difficult”. Some of the older people 
took up a passive lifestyle and seldom showed up at community assemblies (Fig. 10 
(next page) shows the reasons they reported). Even worse, they were reluctant to go 
out of their small shelters and talk to others. Consequently, it turns out that only 
people who were willing to accept help from outside were really benefited. This also 
helps explain the aforementioned high proportion of older persons committing suicide 
or dying alone due to desperate isolation. 
On the other hand, the bonding type of social capital is best exemplified by 
various kinds of neighborhood associations (NHAs). According to Pekkanen and 
Tsujinaka, “NHAs are important to the generation of social capital in Japan”: they 
“can improve government performance, while lowering costs”. NHAs are in a sense 
indispensable, for “participation in face-to-face group activities contributes directly to 
social capital stocks in the community” (2008, 712). Significantly, among NHA chairs 
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one-third is “from the retired elderly, and two-thirds are older than 60” – an evidence 
that participating in NHAs is “a good opportunity for the elderly to enjoy social life” 
and to realize their values (Pekkanen and Tsujinaka 2008, 714). Maeda reports that in 
1996	 approximately 34 percent of the population aged 60 and over are members of 
NHAs (2000, 38). 
 
 
Fig. 10  “Why don’t you attend the communal activities?” 
(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2014, 13) 
 
In a statistical research carried out by Yotsui et al. (2016, 1052), it is shown that 
temporary communities of older people that were formed after the 3.11 earthquake 
“helped reconstruct their own social identities shattered by the dissolution of former 
communities, the shock of displacement and loss of possessions”. The functions of 
these communities are characterized as: 1) rebuilding and revising social identity, and 
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solidarity; 2) creating positive social representations of self and future; 3) helping the 
elderly take ownership of their lives and future; 4) increasing access to culturally 
appropriate local knowledge (Yotsui et al. 2016, 1063-1078). 
Some of the neighborhood associations are formed on the basis of new media 
technology. Traditional media like television and newspapers are older people’s 
primary access to information (Yoshifuji and Watanabe 2017, 7), but they have the 
disadvantage that they only enable one-way communication. In contrast, new media 
like SMS message and social media enhances mutual communication, and thus 
promotes communal bonding. For example, according to a pamphlet, a temporary 
housing unit called “Nagahora-Genki village” has been established in Nagahora 
region, Hirotacho, Rikuzentakata city, and its residents, mostly older people, have 
formed a community via mobile phones they got from Fujitsu and Docomo. They 
created a “group mail network” that is “practically used in daily life”. The messages 
on distribution of living goods are sent via SMS. There is also a village blog that 
automatically sends notification messages to villagers whenever it is updated. This is 
very effective for rehabilitation of social network; even people who are shy and who 
live alone can get to others much more easily (Murakami 2015). 
Although NHAs are more likely to cater to older people’s particular situations 
and needs, usually they are also quite weak at kasetsujūtaku and fukkōjūtaku. The 
former has a highly mobile population, accommodating people without definite 
expectation of when they would leave; the latter suffers from low occupancy rate and 
isolated spaces. Consequently, still a lot of problems that older people face after 3.11 
remain unsolved. 
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Chapter 4  The Family Level 
It is usually mentioned that, compared to other modernized countries, Japan has 
a stronger tradition of family care for the elderly. For example, by argueing that “there 
are some societies, such as Japan, in which the culture (filial piety and respect for 
seniors) and social structure (“vertical” rather than “horizontal”) tend to counteract 
the effects of modernization on the status and prestige of elders”, Palmore is 
suggesting that problems that are typical in a modernized society “can be at least 
partially ameliorated by culture” (1999, 69). Although disasters are not new to human 
being, the structural vulnerability in the face of them is largely produced by processes 
of modernization, such as the decline of the proportion of younger people in rural 
areas. A researcher with Palmore’s optimism might expect that support from within 
families can help older people through the disaster, especially when governments, 
organizations and neighborhood communities fail to cater to their specific needs. This, 
however, is not always the case. 
Observations supporting Palmore’s claim are mostly centered upon the concept 
of filial piety [oyakōkō]. It signifies a complex of values, practical norms and 
regulations. The traditional model of family care is situated within the stem-family (ie) 
system, “a family and residential unit organized around affective bonds among its 
members”. Dating back to 1898, the stem-family system involves “the family, the 
household, and the house itself” (Traphagan 2004b, 36). Usually, the eldest son and 
his spouse would inherit the household, including the parents’ properties, under the 
condition that they take care of the parents. Other siblings exit the household when 
they grow up, either through marriage (for daughters) or through setting up another 
household (for non-successor sons). This old system has the advantage of clarity and 
certainty, for the obligation of caregiving is clearly assigned, and, correspondingly, 
the caregivers are reasonably rewarded. 
Practices of filial piety are also ensured culturally. In an earlier work, Palmore 
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notes that, in Japan, “traditional practices in the family which show respect for the 
elders include honorific language, giving the best seats to the elders, serving elders 
first, elders going through doors first, using the bath first, catering to the tastes of 
elders in cooking, […] and bowing to elders” (1975, 110). Under certain 
circumstances, filial piety even “prescribes the ideology of devotion by the grateful 
child to the parent, and also places debt and obligation at the heart of the discourse on 
parent-child relationships” (Hashimoto 2004, 182). 
If Japanese people were still organized within the stem-family system; if they 
could live up to the norms of filial piety, then they would have shown greater 
resilience against disasters, and older people’s life would have been less impacted. 
However, as the experiences of the elderly in post 3.11 Japan show, it is too idealistic 
to expect their families to carry all the burden. 
Challenges to the old ideal of family care can be classified into two kinds. First, 
pragmatic matters may make it impossible to fulfill the obligations that are dictated in 
the old model, especially when changes in legislation, family structure and lifestyle 
are taken into consideration. As Fig. 11 and Table 6 shows, the traditional structure of 
stem-family is undergoing a process of dissolution during the past thirty years, 
making it less and less feasible to stick to the old model of family care. 
 
Fig. 11  The change of the number of members in a Japanese family 
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Table 6  Percentage of elderly households among private households 
(Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan 2016, 12) 
Type 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Elderly households (households 
with members over 65) 
29.13% 32.19% 35.10% 37.30% 41.48% 
One-person elderly households 5.02% 6.48% 7.88% 9.24% 10.84% 
Aged-couple households 6.29% 7.83% 9.15% 10.13% - 
 
Besides, Coulmas notes that “legal reforms after World War II based on equal 
rights of the sexes and equal inheritance by all children have paved the way for a 
steady movement away from the three-generation ie family model to the nuclear 
family”, although “this trend has been slow, and co-residence with aged parents 
continues to be much more common in Japan than in Europe and North America” 
(2007, 64). The incompatibility between legal reform and actual practice sometimes 
results in situations where caregivers do not receive a fair amount of reward: for 
example, “even though the eldest son and his wife take care of the aging parents, they 
may receive the same share of inheritance as the other sibling(s)” (Kawano 2010, 38). 
Moreover, the wife may also be taking care of her own parents, without receiving the 
major amount of their inheritance. The obligation of the eldest son to be the caregiver, 
which is still strong in practice, can also obstruct the son in getting married, because 
the obligation is considered “an unattractive characteristic for a spouse, at best” 
(Traphagan 2004a, 198). 
Table 7  The net-migration of disaster-hit prefectures in 2014 and 2015 
 2014 2015 
Iwate -3,200 -4,122 
Miyagi 2,437 -76 
Fukushima -2,211 -2,395 
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The situation is aggravated by the fact that the younger generation prefer to 
migrate into urban areas, while their parents are left in the countryside (Table 7). 
Caring for the elderly distracts young people from urban life and can even threaten 
their occupational careers. One of the reasons why equal inheritance is not carried out 
very often in practice is that younger sons prefer to legally give up their claims to 
inheritance, just in order to be exempt from the duty of caregiving (Izuhara 2002). 
Ōtani reports that, after 3.11, “many families now live separately, whereas before the 
disaster they lived in three- or even four-generation households”, the reason being that 
“the young and middle-aged might have moved to the city in the search of jobs and 
cash income”, while “older people might have been left alone in their original houses, 
or in evacuation centers” (2014, 130-131). In my fieldtrip to a kasetsujūtaku in 
Rikuzentakata in May 2016, I talked with an old woman, aged between 70 and 80, at 
the community assembly. She told me that her grandson lives in Hokkaidō and they 
meet only once or twice a year, and it has become less often than when her grandson 
was younger. She remains silent on her own children. 
If the children choose to live with their aged parents, the price can be very high, 
especially when the parents live in disaster-hit areas. Mugikura et al. mention a 
daughter who lives with her widowed father. In order to take care of her father, the 
daughter remains unmarried and unemployed. Apart from earning a bit in the stock 
market, which is very unreliable, this small household depends largely on the father’s 
pension. Nor will the daughter receive pension when she grows old. The daughter said 
that she has “terminated her life / career (jinsei wo owareseta) too early in her 30s” 
(2016, 41). In another case, a 50-year-old couple lives with the parents of the husband 
in a kasetsujūtaku. They have been living there for 3.5 years, and are expected to stay 
for another 3-5 years in order to save enough money for the rehabilitation of their own 
house on the privately owned land (Mugikura et al. 2016, 42). This is so because the 
income of people who live in disaster-hit areas with their parents is very limited. 
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The second kind of challenge to the old ideal of family care is connected with the 
discrepancy of values between generations. The current aged group comprises a 
cohort that were “socialized early in life to expect an old-age in which a male child 
and that child’s spouse and children would co-reside, providing company and, if 
needed be, care as time went on” (Traphagan 2004b, 37-38). On the other hand, the 
young generation is much more familiar with values of the modern, individualized 
society. There are sometimes reactions against the rigid ideology of filial piety. 
Because “the piety discourse engenders a disempowerment of youth”, youth 
“problems” emerge as “forms of response to social disempowerment and as modes of 
passive resistance to a generational power hierarchy rooted in a world of social 
obligations”, such as “social withdrawal, school absenteeism, classroom anarchy, teen 
prostitution, and juvenile homicide” (Hashimoto 2004, 184). Palmore also mentions 
that these is “a theme of resentment and desire to abandon senile and incapacitated 
aged which can be found in many stories and a recent best-selling novel” (1975, 111). 
The issue of the Law for the Prevention of Elderly Abuse and Support for Caregivers 
in 2006 indicates that “cultural values such as filial piety and respect for elders are no 
sufficient safeguard	against abuse of elderly people” (Coulmas 2007, 69). In the face 
of disasters, the relationship between generations is sometimes deteriorated, though 
compromises can also take place. 
Given these situations, it is difficult to agree with Palmore’s claim in 1975 that 
“the Japanese tradition of filial responsibility and respect for the aged seems to be the 
main force maintaining integration of the aged in their families despite the 
counterforces of industrialization” (1975, 52-53). The economical outweighs the 
cultural in the long term. 
The occurrence of the disaster radicalizes the conflicts between older people and 
their children, making it even harder to reconcile their respective needs. As a result, 
alternative modes of caregiving can be recognized in the post-disaster society. Some 
older people “are able to obtain support to stay longer in their own homes with 
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minimal or no family assistance because they have paid service providers to perform 
some caregiving tasks” (Long 2008, 209); others simply opted for “co-survivorship in 
a couple”, namely caregiving by a spouse (Kawano 2010, 38). It is not always easy 
for an old couple to live on their own. Mugikura et al. tell about an old couple whose 
children live in big cities. After 3.11, they were accommodated in a kasetsujūtaku, and 
the government is not sure whether if their previous land can be rehabilitated and so 
returned to them. Then have no money to rebuild their house, and although the 
husband is a master carpenter, he is already very old. The wife is worried that, if her 
husband dies, she can find no way to carry on her life (2016, 41). An old lady I knew 
refused volunteer caregivers because she “does not want to be a trouble to others”; 
she only agreed to subscribe to a newspaper, so that the postman would know it when 
she eventually passes away. Her neighbor, a man between 40 and 50 who also lives 
alone, would occasionally bring her some food or eat together with her. 
It is proper to conclude here that, in contemporary Japan, care for the elderly 
from their families is not always more reliable than that from their neighborhood. On 
the other hand, people are likely to be encouraged to live with their parents in 
disaster-hit areas if the government issues them specific funds or carries out programs 
such as income-tax deduction for people who support their aged parents (Maeda 2000, 
38). 
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Chapter 5  The Personal Level 
While the situation of older people is easier to track on the governmental, 
organizational or family level, it is difficult to evaluate their personal feelings, 
self-perceptions and emotions. Things at the personal level become manifest 
predominantly through overt self-expression. As the elderly usually has less 
opportunity to speak out in public, concerns on their feelings at the personal level are 
deficient, especially as compared to those on other levels such as sustenance or 
community building. 
Moreover, there is a trend to focus on levels other than the personal when it 
comes to post-disaster rehabilitation. Expenditures, policies and organizations are 
comparatively more patent and more controllable. When the government, 
organizations or other family members interfere in older people’s affairs and make 
judgments for them without taking their own opinion into serious consideration, the 
personal level of caring for the elderly after disaster is left untouched. When this 
becomes the routine, the personal level may even become forgotten and dissolved. 
One of the major causes of the oblivion of the personal feelings of the elderly is 
ageism, an essentialist picture of the elderly as unable to make reasonable decisions 
because of their old age and its natural consequences. This image of old age is, 
however, a socially constructed one, and even the most certain piece of knowledge 
concerning old age is produced and propagated in order to facilitate the corresponding 
system of value and power within a specific social context. 
Although ageism is often broadly defined as “any prejudice or discrimination 
against or in favor of an age group” (Palmore 1999, 4), this paper confines itself to 
negative ageism towards the elderly. It is indeed the type of ageism that is most 
commonly found and most severely practiced (Butler 1969, 3-4). 
There are various manifestations of ageism. Below are some examples of 
negative ageism towards the elderly (Palmore 1999, 3-4): 
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• Older persons falter for a moment because they are unsure of themselves and are 
immediately charged with being “infirm.” 
• Older persons are constantly “protected” and their thoughts interpreted. Older persons 
forget someone’s name and are charged with senility and patronized. 
• Older persons are expected to “accept” the “facts of aging.” 
• Older persons miss a word or fail to hear a sentence and they are charged with “getting 
old,” not with a hearing difficulty. 
• Older persons are called “dirty” because they show sexual feeling or affection to one of 
either sex. 
• Older persons are called “cranky” when they are expressing a legitimate distaste with 
life as so many young do. 
• Older persons are charged with being “like a child” even after society has ensured that 
they are as dependent, helpless, and powerless as children. 
In terms of the means of manifestation, Palmore distinguishes ageist stereotypes 
and discrimination. Stereotypes are “mistaken or exaggerated beliefs about a group” 
(1999, 19), whereas discrimination signifies “inappropriate […] treatments of 
members of that age group (such as compulsory retirement)” (1999, 4). Roughly 
speaking, the former corresponds to perception and judgement, the latter to act and 
institution. A number of examples of ageist institution were already presented in 
previous chapters, such as the compulsory retirement system. Stereotypes are usually 
more personal, taken either by younger people or by older people themselves. 
Stereotypes of the elderly include illness, impotency, ugliness, mental decline, mental 
illness, uselessness, isolation, poverty and depression (Palmore 1999, 20-28). 
Ageist institution and stereotypes are mutually constitutive. On the one hand, 
institutionalized practices strengthen and solidify the stereotypes that are presumed 
within them; on the other hand, stereotypes give rise to unequal rules and norms that 
usually appear to be “rational” because of people’s ignorance about the stereotypes 
they carry. A survey on stereotypes of different social groups reveals that older people 
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are perceived to be “incompetent and warm” (Fig. 12). This, in turn, results in the 
corresponding affection of pity (Cuddy and Fiske 2002, 9-10). 
 
 
Fig. 12  American social groups arrayed along perceived competence 
and perceived warmth and sorted by cluster analysis 
 
However, the pity thus aroused can be problematic, especially when it affects 
institutional practices. In a post-disaster society, this is exemplified by the scarce 
attention to older people’s self-perception and self-expression despite the 
preponderant media coverage on their external situations. Among the reports and 
interviews concerning older people in disaster-hit areas, many were in fact presenting 
younger people speaking on behalf of the elderly. Even though some older people had 
the opportunity to speak, on the television for example, both they themselves and the 
interviewers were explicitly or implicitly aware of a certain framework of discourse, 
so that what eventually got uttered was still largely about visible and measurable facts 
instead of genuine and candid feelings. It seems that the whole society, including 
older people themselves, are collaborating to suppress or to forget the innermost 
(highest for the competent-cold cluster), admiration (highest for the
competent-warm cluster), pity (highest for the incompetent-warm clus-
ter), and contempt (highest for the incompetent-cold cluster).
Content of Elderly Stereotypes
Strong evidence independently suggests that the global category elderly
people falls squarely into the warm and incompetent cluster of stereotyped
groups (Fiske et al. 1999, 2001; Heckhausen, Dixon, and Baltes 1989; Kite
et al. 1991). In the Fiske et al. (1999, 2001) survey studies, elderly people
reliably fell into the warm-incompetent cluster, alongside disabled and re-
tarded people (figure 1.1). Elderly people wer  rated as less compete t
than eighteen of twenty-four groups and warmer than twenty-two of
twenty-four groups (see figure 1.1). Competence ratings averaged only
2.63 out of 5.00 (bel w th  scale midpoint), and warmth r tings ve g d
3.78 (well above the scale midpoint). The two scores differed significantly
from each other in all samples. These clusters were accompanied by dis-
tinct prejudice . When asked a ut the warm-incompe ent cluster that in-
cluded elderly people, participants most endorsed items reflecting
paternalistic prejudice (pity and sympathy) and least endorsed emotions
reflecting envy (envy and jealousy).
10 Amy J.C. Cuddy
Figure 1.1
American social groups arrayed along perceived competence and perceived
warmth and sorted by cluster analysis.
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selves or individuality of the elderly – in a sense, there is hardly anything personal 
about them. 
This leads to the second cause of the ignorance of the personal feelings of the 
elderly, namely the lack of the sense of the self in Japanese individuality. For sure, 
Japanese people seldom feel the lack of identity within their society; but the 
acquisition and preservation of such identities are not unconditional. If older people 
fail to meet these conditions, they may be socially “depersonalized”; even if they 
don’t, the constant attempt to meet the conditions would gradually dissolve their 
individual thoughts and needs into undifferentiated conformity. 
Ruth Benedict is right when she proposes in her pioneering research that “the arc 
of life in Japan” (Fig. 13) is “a great shallow U-curve with maximum freedom and 
indulgence allowed to babies and to the old”; that “after the age of sixty men and 
women are almost as unhampered by shame as little children are” (1946, 254). 
However, “freedom and indulgence”, or being “unhampered”, does not necessarily 
mean status and dignity. If we take into consideration the fact that “Japanese 
normative values emphasize social utility as a foundation for generating a sense of 
self-worth and self-identity” (Traphagan 2000, 4, my emphasis), it becomes clear that 
freedom and indulgence might imply the opposite of esteem. 
 
 
Fig. 13  Japanese and American Arc of Life (Palmore 1975, 109) 
 
For example, in his research on the discourse of boke, a “culturally constituted 
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category of illness”, Traphagan shows that boke is “a moral concept”, which is “tied 
to an individual’s social responsibility to be an active, contributing member of society 
by taking care of one’s physical and mental health, to avoid situations that burden 
others, and to return the obligations one incurs through relationships of 
interdependence with others”. The boke condition corresponds to a person who fails 
to fulfill such responsibility, and is “a condition that is viewed as fundamentally 
antisocial in nature” (2000, 4). The tricky moment of the discourse is that “the boke 
condition is one in which a person has allowed himself or herself to drop out of the 
game” (2000, 182): the failure is culturally interpreted as deliberate self-abandonment. 
Correspondingly, the boke condition is associated with “a loss of self-identity and 
entrance into a form of life outside that of normative social tendencies”; it is “a social 
death from which one is released only in physical death” (2000, 184). In short, the 
grant of dignity to the elderly poses the premise that they are still functional to the 
society. 
Other researches support this observation. Palmore mentions that respect for 
elders is “based on the elders’ fairness, wisdom and aid”. If they turn out to be “unjust, 
immoral, or unpleasant”, however, they are “no longer respected” (1975, 111). What 
gets respected, in the name of filial piety for example, is the social role of the elderly 
rather than the elderly themselves as individuals; individuals who do not qualify for 
the role are denied respect. 
Traphagan studies the ritual actions carried out by the elderly in the rural area of 
Tōhoku, and find that they “play a central role […] in maintaining, or caretaking, 
well-being”. The role of maintaining well-being for the whole family is the source of 
respectfulness of the elderly, and they tend to “reify” it by means of making it “not 
only the property, but the embodied possession, of themselves and the groups to 
which they belong” (2004b, 181). Old people purposefully make themselves “useful” 
to the family and to the society, so as not to fall out of respect. Otherwise they would 
probably be marginalized, as Jenike shows with the case of great-grandparents. 
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Because the great-grandparent “fills only a symbolic role”, “with no duties to perform 
within the household”, they are usually “left lonely and isolated even in the midst of a 
large, bustling extended family” (Jenike 2004, 218). 
As older people tend to dissolve themselves into the roles that are assigned to 
them, and as such roles are mostly prescribed in an ageist manner, they sometimes get 
stuck in self-accusation. From the perspective of a highly functional society, they find 
themselves to be burdens and troubles (Long 2008, 209), especially during the hard 
time of evacuation and post-disaster rehabilitation. Consequently, the motivation to 
articulate their personal opinions and feelings is further suppressed. 
The oblivion of the personal emotions and needs of the elderly results in various 
kinds of deficiency in post-disaster policy-making, projects of organizations, and 
familial decisions. Ōtani takes a close look at this aspect by emphasizing different 
senses of vulnerability. While some of the senses, such as the economic and the social, 
are more visible, there is still another implicit sense of vulnerability concerning the 
lived experience of the elderly. As Ōtani says (2014, 131): 
After a disaster, survivors are especially vulnerable, and life at evacuation centres and 
temporary shelters following a disaster raises challenges for all the main aspects of human 
security: “freedom from fear”, “freedom from want”, as well as “freedom to live in 
dignity”. Life in evacuation centres may be temporary but such situations challenge the 
dignity of survivors. They often lack privacy. This may be more of a challenge for women. 
Losing their jobs also challenges the dignity of survivors. Immediately afterwards they are 
more concerned with surviving day to day, but over time they become more concerned with 
what they have lost because of the disaster. In this sense, both “fear”, and “want” are 
present but shift from the emergency period over the mid and longer term. Survivors soon 
fear for what will happen to them and how they will be able to make a living when they 
have lost everything. 
While the public pays attention to governmental and communal levels as a direct 
response to the emergency, in the long run the personal level is at least equally 
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important. Although older people, like others, might care very little during the 
emergency period, various needs re-emerge as the panic is over. When these needs are 
not adequately addressed, it would be no less painful for them to survive. Moreover, 
the projects of rehabilitation are largely pragmatist, and thus often ignore older 
people’s “strong emotional attachments to long cherished property and mementoes 
that have been lost”, as well as their “lower adaptability than in their younger days” 
(Ōtani 2014, 134). The adaptability here is not only practical, but also psychological. 
It is difficult to address, within a socio-engineering framework, the inadequacy of 
uprooting people from their homes like transporting objects, or assuming that anyone 
is able to get adapted to a totally new environment in no time. 
As the oblivion of the personal factors has negative effects on the situation of the 
elderly in a post-disaster society, it is helpful to confront the oblivion by means of 
counterbalancing its causes. 
Ageism can be dissolved in similar ways as sexism and racism are. Like sexism 
and racism, ageism is wrong in that it confuses a natural category with a 
socio-cultural one. What exactly ageism confuses, however, is not easily clarified. 
Cohen (2000) makes a distinction between senility and dementia. While the clinical 
term dementia “presumes a focus on the pathology of the individual”, and thus can be 
clearly defined in terms of natural science, senility signifies “a process rooted in the 
material changes of physiology and political economy and in a diverse set of social 
practices that determine how generational and other sorts of difference come to matter” 
(Cohen 2000, xv). Now it is obvious that, when people talk about old age, they 
actually refer to senility, while they talk as if the elderly all fall within the category of 
dementia. Ageism can be viewed as a combination of the absoluteness of dementia 
(which senility lacks) and the pervasiveness of senility (which dementia lacks). 
Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) approaches the same topic with their distinction 
between 1) “a phenomenally experienced individual body-self”, 2) “a social body, a 
natural symbol for thinking about relationships among nature, society, and culture”, 
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and 3) “a body politic, an artifact of social and political control”. While the social 
body, and especially the body politic, becomes old at a definite age, the individual 
body-self enjoys greater variety. Like Matsumoto says, “lumping together people who 
have varied health and living conditions in a single category of the ‘elderly’, and 
assuming that their lives and needs are similar because of their advanced age, is 
utterly meaningless” (2011, 7). As long as their variety gets revealed, comprehended 
and disseminated, people will less frequently perceive older people as homogeneous, 
and consequently, the public will allow more openness to and patience for different 
people’s different ideas. This is also the way to confront conformism is Japan. 
This is a project that takes years or even generations to fulfill. For now, more 
modes of expression and communication should be applied so as to enable older 
people to voice their specific needs and concerns. For example, Keiko Utsumi, a 
94-year-old female stand-up master comedian (manzaishi), posted a twitter to address 
older people’s mood when they hear others talk about sleeping in a car as a shelter to 
avoid injury in aftershocks. “I want to address anyway”, says she, “that one wants to 
lie down with a futon – is it impossible to bring a simple bed with a mattress on a 
plate door to the shelter?” (Fig. 14) Perhaps she is just articulating what most of older 
people want to say; but with new media her voice is heard by more people without 
being edited, abridged or censored. 
 
 
Fig. 14  Keiko Utsumi’s Twitter 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
This paper presents an examination on the specificity of older people’s situation 
in post 3.11 Japan. It is carried out at the governmental, the organizational, the family, 
and the personal level. 
Although government policies and practices play a large part in evacuation and 
post-disaster rehabilitation, they have drawbacks such as generality, manipulation and 
implicit discrimination. These lead to certain kinds of vulnerability of the elderly. 
Some policies with good intention, including the three-step accommodation system 
and the provision of condolence money, fail to meet their goals because of ignorance 
of older people’s specific needs such as privacy, communal bonds and aid to 
overcome procedural obstacles. 
Organizations play an intermediary role between the government and individuals. 
They bring about both bridging and bonding types of social capital to the elderly. 
NPOs answer needs that are not fulfilled by the government, but also suffer from 
blind enthusiasm and lack of professional skills. Neighborhood associations enhance 
participation in face-to-face activities, and helps older people reconstruct their 
identities after the shock. But the bonds they create are usually very weak due to the 
instability of the community. 
Although families are expected to help older people through the disaster by 
catering to their specific needs, they often fail to do so, because the stem-family 
system, the basis of the traditional practice of filial piety, is undergoing disintegration. 
Changes in rules of inheritance, as well as in young people’s lifestyle, give rise to this 
disintegration; and it gets worse after the disaster due to decrease of source of income. 
As a result, the provision of family care from children is getting less reliable, and is 
giving way to alternative modes such as paid caregiver, co-survivorship in a couple, 
or mutual care within neighborhood. 
Compared to other levels, the personal level, concerning older people’s feelings, 
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self-perceptions and emotions, is more invisible and underrepresented. It is forgotten 
when others routinely make decisions for the elderly. The sources of this oblivion are 
negative ageism towards the elderly and the absence of the self in Japanese identity. 
Older people are conceived as deserving pity, and their dignity is threatened by the 
suppression and self-suppression within a highly functional society. This, in turn, 
leads to the situation that their innermost feelings are scarcely articulated and thus 
barely cared about. 
It is clear from the discussion in previous chapters that the problem of the elderly 
in post-3.11 Japan is not solvable at any single level. One cannot reduce all 
phenomena to results of a single factor, be it governmental practice, change in social 
capital, or arbitrary wills of a group of people. After all, the levels that are 
investigated in this paper only represent some perspectives of inquiry. It is the variety 
and specificity of older people’s situations that a proper research on them has to 
respect. Correspondingly, the foremost implication of this research is the importance 
of being patient to, and leaving space for, the multiplicity of the voices of the elderly. 
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